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Abstract: The 2007-2009 financial crisis was caused by financial markets’ greed and instability. The 
crisis led public debts and deficits to rise substantially in developed countries. Financial markets and 
international institutions claim for a “fiscal exit strategy” through rapid reductions in public deficits 
and substantial falls in public debts owing to large public spending cuts (especially social 
expenditure). The article shows that the state of public finances was generally satisfactory before the 
crisis; the rise in deficits was needed for macroeconomic stabilisation purposes and does not signal 
higher future interest rates or inflation. ‘Crisis exit strategies’ should keep interest rates at low levels 
and government deficits, as long as they are necessary to support activity; they should question 
financial globalisation and macroeconomic strategies in neo-mercantilist and in liberal countries. The 
crisis should not be an opportunity for leading classes and European technocracies to cut social 
spending. Strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact would be dangerous if it deprived Member 
States of policy tools that were helpful in the crisis. The euro area should fight against speculation on 
public debts by ensuring that public debts are collectively guaranteed by the ECB and the Member 
States. World economic stability is not threatened by public finances imbalances, but by growing 
speculative financial activity. 
 
Résumé : La crise financière de 2007-2009 a été causée par l’avidité et l’instabilité des marchés 
financiers. Elle a provoqué un fort gonflement des dettes et des déficits publics dans les pays 
développés. Les marchés financiers comme les institutions internationales réclament une politique de 
sortie de crise, passant par une réduction rapide des déficits, une forte baisse du niveau des dettes, ceci 
grâce à une forte réduction des dépenses publiques (et en particulier des dépenses sociales). L’article 
montre que la situation des finances publiques était globalement satisfaisante avant la crise ; que le 
creusement des déficits s’explique par les nécessités de la régulation macroéconomique ; qu’il 
n’annonce ni hausse des taux d’intérêt, ni hausse des taux d’inflation. La stratégie de sortie de crise 
doit comporter le maintien de bas taux d’intérêt et de déficit publics, tant qu’ils seront nécessaires pour 
soutenir l’activité, la remise en cause de la globalisation financière et des stratégies 
macroéconomiques des pays néo-mercantilistes comme des pays libéraux. La crise ne doit pas être 
l’occasion pour les classes dominantes et les technocraties européennes de réduire les dépenses 
sociales. Le renforcement du Pacte de stabilité et de croissance serait dangereux s’il privait les pays 
membres des armes qui ont été utiles durant la crise. La zone euro doit lutter contre la spéculation sur 
les dettes publiques en affirmant que celles-ci sont collectivement garanties par la BCE et les Etats 
membres. La stabilité économique mondiale n’est pas menacée par le déséquilibre des finances 
publiques, mais par le gonflement des activités financières spéculatives.  
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The 2007-2009 financial crisis was caused by the blindness and the greed of financial markets 
and institutions, by unsustainable macroeconomic strategies undertaken on the one hand by 
‘mercantilist’ countries (China, Germany) and on the other hand by Anglo-Saxon countries, 
but not by a high burden of public expenditures, debts or deficits. 
The financial crisis has shown that fiscal policy, public intervention and regulation remain 
necessary. The crisis provoked a rapid rise in public debts and deficits as governments had to 
intervene to rescue the financial system, recorded lower tax receipts (and higher 
unemployment expenditure), and had to implement measures to support activity. The 2008-
2010 rise in government debts was not due to extravagant fiscal policies but to the 
combination of lower tax receipts and fiscal measures necessary to stabilise the economy.  
In 2010, financial markets pretend to have doubts about the sustainability of public finances, 
even in industrial countries, and ask for large cuts in budget deficits even though the latter are 
needed to support activity. 
The situation is particularly worrying in the euro area where the economic policy framework 
is not satisfactory. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has no economic basis; Member 
States (MS) cannot and do not want not to obey stupid rules; national economic policies are 
not really coordinated; economic disparities are growing; these disparities are not taken into 
account in European policies coordination; the ECB’s independence is problematic in times of 
financial crisis. 
In the current debt crisis, what are the responsibilities of too lax fiscal policies in some EU 
countries, of the poor economic policy framework in the euro area and of dysfunction in 
sophisticated and speculative financial markets?  
In 2010, almost all OECD countries experienced large public deficits and large public debt 
increases. Should governments rely on growth to reduce government deficits? Should they, 
under the pressure of financial markets, quickly cut spending with a view to restore 
sustainable public finances at the risk of slowing down the recovery? Will the financial crisis 
allows leading classes and European technocracies to impose to population restrictive 
economic policies, liberal reforms and social spending cuts?  
Could the euro area survive? Could EU institutions and MS implement a more satisfying 
economic framework? 
 
1. EU fiscal policies before the crisis 
At the beginning of 2008, the EU’s struggle against excessive public deficits appeared to have 
been successful. In June, the ECOFIN Council announced that no euro area country was 
under an excessive deficit procedure (EDP), while five countries in the area were under an 
EDP in 2006 (table 1).  
Fiscal consolidation was not undertaken in euro area countries in 1998-2000 when GDP 
growth was satisfying (table 2). The cyclically-adjusted public balance (CAPB) deteriorated. 
The cyclical improvement in public finances and lower interest payments allowed 
government borrowing balances to move away from the excessive deficit threshold of 3% of 
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GDP. EU authorities deplored that MS did not use the cyclical upturn to bring more rapidly 
their deficits close to balance.  
 
Table 1. The Excessive Deficit Procedures  
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Portugal 24/9 EDP 11/5 22/6 EDP EDP 3/6 07/10 EDP 
France   2/4 EDP EDP EDP 30/1   18/2 EDP 
Germany 19/11 EDP EDP EDP EDP 16/5   07/10 EDP 
Netherlands     28/4 7/6       07/10 EDP 
Greece     19/5 EDP EDP 16/5   18/2 EDP 
Italy       16/6 EDP EDP 3/6 07/10 EDP 
Spain               18/2 EDP 
Ireland               18/2 EDP 
Belgium               07/10 EDP 
Austria               07/10 EDP 
Finland                 12/5 
Table 2. Public finances in the euro area 
  GDP growth, % Public balance, % of GDP 
Interest 
payments 
Cyclical 
component CAPB 
1998 2.8 -2.3 4.2 -0.5 2.4 
1999 2.8 -1.4 3.7 -0.1 2.4 
2000 4.0 -1.1 3.5 0.8 1.6 
2001 1.9 -1.9 3.3 0.7 0.7 
2002 0.9 -2.6 3.1 0 0.5 
2003 0.8 -3.1 2.9 -0.6 0.4 
2004 1.9 -3.0 2.8 -0.7 0.5 
2005 1.8 -2.6 2.7 -1.0 1.1 
2006 3.1 -1.3 2.6 -0.4 1.9 
2007 2.7 -0.6 2.6 -0.1 2.1 
2008 -0.5 -2.0 2.7 -0.8 1.5 
2009 -4.0 -6.1 2.8 -3.8 0.5 
 
But MS refused to agree with the Commission’s estimate of equilibrium unemployment rates 
(9.3% for the area). Countries with high unemployment, rapid GDP growth and no 
inflationary pressures wished to maintain their growth for as long as possible so as to reduce 
their unemployment rate. They considered that the euro area had significant budgetary rooms 
for manoeuvre, with the CAPB standing at around 2 percent of GDP.  
Public deficits appeared excessive (in terms of the 3% of GDP threshold of the Maastricht 
Treaty) in 2003-2004, when the output level was weak and when implementing restrictive 
policies as requested by the Commission would have been counter-productive. This situation 
led to tensions in the euro area in November 2003 when the Commission tried to oblige 
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France, Italy, Germany and Portugal to change their fiscal policies. In 2005, six countries 
were under an EDP, even if the fiscal impulse was small at the euro area level in 2002-2004. 
From 2004 to 2007, the situation of public finances improved at the euro area level (by 2.4 
percent of GDP in terms of public deficits), partly due to the cyclical component (0.6 
percentage point), partly due to fiscal efforts (1.6 percentage points), mainly in Portugal (2.8 
percent of GDP), Germany (2 percent of GDP), and Italy (1.7 percent of GDP). These fiscal 
efforts induced relatively low growth in the three countries. 
During this period, inflation rates were low in the area. At the area level, the real interest rate 
was equal to GDP growth. The wage share in GDP decreased by 2.3 percentage points from 
1999 to 2007. The euro area external account was in surplus. There is no evidence that fiscal 
policies were on the whole too expansionary. Fiscal deficits were necessary to support 
activity: they were stabilisation deficits. They did not result from too lax fiscal policies: they 
were not disequilibrium deficits.  
From 1997 to 2007, the improvement of the euro area structural balance came from decreases 
in interest payments and primary public expenditures (table 3). It was limited by lower tax 
revenues, especially in Germany, Austria, Finland, and France. Most countries adopted tax 
cut strategies in a context of tax competition. The EU did not adopt a tax harmonization 
policy to prevent tax competition.  
 
Table 3. Evolution in public finances, 1997/2007 (cyclically adjusted, % of GDP) 
 Total revenues Interest payments  Primary expenditures Public balance 
Euro area -1.5 -1.6 -1.4 +1.5 
Germany -2.5 -0.5 -3.7 +1.7 
France -1.6 -0.6 -0.8 -0.2 
Italy -1.0 -3.9 +2.2 +0.7 
Spain +2.2 -3.1 +0.3 +5.1 
Netherlands 0.0 -2.6 +0.8 +1.7 
Belgium -0.5 -3.4 +2.3 +1.7 
Greece -0.8 -4.1 +1.5 +1.9 
Austria -4.6 -1.2 -5.0 +1.5 
Portugal +3.8 -1.0 +3.5 +1.2 
Finland -2.4 -2.4 -6.4 +6.4 
Structural deficits before the crisis?  
In 2007, most MS had a primary public balance (PPB) in surplus: 2% of GDP for the euro 
area (table 4). If we compare the PPB level with the level required to stabilize the debt/GDP 
ratio, we can see that only France had problems; neither Greece, nor Spain. Countries like 
Spain, Greece or Ireland benefited from low interest rates relatively to their growth rate. Their 
debts stabilised, but the equilibrium was fragile, as it depends from the gap between interest 
rates and GDP growth. In 2007, financial markets did not discriminate public debts among 
MS. They thought that the euro area was robust.  
The crisis has caused a sharp deterioration of fiscal balances, but this deterioration reflects the 
output fall and the use of fiscal policy to support growth. Current fiscal deficits are not 
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indicators of pre-crisis public finance structural imbalances that should be cured by restrictive 
fiscal policies. 
 
Table 4. Public debt stability in 2007  
  Public balance Primary public balance Net debt 
Real interest 
rate less GDP 
growth  
Debt stability 
gap 
Germany   0.2  2.6 42.9   1.6  1.9 
France -2.7 -0.2 34.0   0.2 -0.3 
Italy -1.7  3.0 89.6   0.9  2.2 
Spain  1.9  3.0 18.7 -3.2  3.6 
Netherlands  0.2  1.8 28.0   0.3  1.7 
Belgium -0.2  3.5 73.4 -0.2  3.6 
Austria -0.7  1.3 30.7 -0.3  1.4 
Greece -5.1  -0.9 70.4 -2.9  1.1 
Portugal -2.3  0.6 44.1   0.6  0.3 
Finland  5.2  4.6 -71.1 -0.3  4.4 
Ireland   0.2  0.9 -0.3 -3.4  0.8 
Euro area -0.6 2.0 43.3 0.1 2.0 
United Kingdom -2.7 -0.7 28.8 -0.3 -0.6 
United States -2.8 -0.8 47.2 -1.1 -0.3 
Japan -2.5 -1.9 80.4   0.7 -2.6 
 
2. Disparities in the euro area 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis can be viewed as a test of the euro area’s ability to react 
adequately to shocks affecting the global economy. However, even before the crisis started, 
the euro area was characterised by rising imbalances between two groups of countries 
implementing two instable macroeconomic strategies: neo-mercantilist strategies in some 
virtuous Northern countries (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands), experiencing 
competitiveness gains and accumulating huge external surpluses while some Southern 
countries accumulated huge external deficits under imbalanced high growth strategies driven 
by strong negative real interest rates (see Deroose et al., 2004, Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 
2007). The economic policy framework introduced by the Maastricht Treaty was unable to 
prevent the widening of these imbalances which became unsustainable under the effect of the 
crisis. The euro area thus has to face global issues – is the area condemned to poor growth? 
How to avoid the rise in public debts without plunging the economy into recession? – and 
specific problems: how to avoid growing disparities among euro area countries? Is it possible 
to implement a more satisfying governance framework?  
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Growth differentials 
GDP growth was relatively satisfactory in the euro area between 1985 and 1991 (3.1 percent 
per year, table 5), but decelerated by 1.3 percentage points per year from 1992 to 1998 due to 
a bad management of the German reunification and to contractionary fiscal policies 
implemented in the convergence process to meet the Maastricht criteria. The launch of the 
single currency in 1999 did not enable the area to reach a more satisfactory growth. Since 
1991, GDP has grown less rapidly in the euro area than in the UK or in the US (1.9 percent 
per year, versus respectively 2.7 and 3.3) 
From 1999 to 2007, GDP growth remained strong in Ireland and accelerated in three 
countries: Spain, Greece and Finland. Looking at average GDP growth rates in 1999-2007 
and 1985-1991, the winners were Ireland, Greece and Finland; the losers were Portugal, 
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Three countries had below 2% GDP growth rates (Italy, 
Germany, and Portugal); four countries had above 3% growth rates (Finland, Spain, Greece, 
and Ireland). In the crisis, the more severely hit countries were the previously successful ones 
(Ireland, Finland, Spain) and the more export-oriented ones (Germany).  
 
Table 5. GDP growth rates  (%, per year) 
 1985-1991 1992-1998 1999-2007 2008-2010 
Euro area 3.1 1.8 2.1 -0.8 
Belgium 2.7 1.8 2.3  -0.3 
Germany 3.5 1.5 1.6  -0.8 
Greece 1.7 1.8 4.1  -0.1 
Spain 3.9 2.3 3.7 -1.0 
France 2.6 1.8 2.2 -0.2 
Ireland 4.0 7.2 6.6  -3.8 
Italy 2.9 1.3 1.5  -1.7 
Netherlands 3.6 2.7 2.5  -0.4 
Austria 3.1 2.2 2.5  -0.1 
Portugal 5.1 2.4 1.7 -0.8 
Finland 1.8 2.5 3.4 -1.8 
Denmark 1.5 2.7 1.9 -1.6 
Sweden 1.9 2.7 3.2 -1.0 
UK 2.6 2.7 2.8 -1.0 
US 2.8 3.6 3.0  0.4 
Source: European Commission. 
 
Greece and Spain have been converging towards the area average in terms of GDP per head 
(in PPP) while Italy has been diverging downwards and Ireland upwards: in 16 years (from 
1991 to 2007), GDP per head relative to the euro area rose by 70% in Ireland, 26% in Greece, 
21% in Spain while it remained stable in Portugal (table 6). Among the largest economies, 
GDP per head relative to the euro area declined by 10.5 % in Italy, 5% in France, and 3.5% in 
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Germany, whereas it rose by 14% in the UK. Non euro area EU economies performed better 
than the euro area ones. 
 
Table 6. PPP GDP per head 
PPP GDP per head, euro area=100 
 
1991 2007 
Euro area 100.0 100.0 
Belgium 108.7 105.3 
Germany 108.9 105.4 
Greece 67.0 84.4 
Spain 79.2 95.5 
France 104.2 98.7 
Ireland 78.8 134.5 
Italy 105.3 94.2 
Netherlands 107.0 120.3 
Austria 113.8 111.9 
Portugal 68.6 68.8 
Finland 97.6 107.8 
Denmark 106.7 110.3 
Sweden 108.2 111.7 
UK 93.6 106.2 
US 131.1 141.6 
Source: European Commission. 
Inflation differentials 
A good functioning of the monetary union requires avoiding price levels disparities. Different 
price levels will generate competitiveness differentials which will need to be corrected later 
through output growth differentials. In practice, inflation differentials have remained 
substantial in the euro area (table 7). Countries running higher inflation were mainly catching-
up ones, with higher output growth and low initial price levels, due to the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect (Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal). However Italy and the Netherlands also had 
relatively high inflation rates. The Dutch economy ran at above capacity for several years and 
inflation was increased by several rises in indirect taxation. Even when accounting for the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, which may explain 1 percentage point of inflation in Greece, 0.7 in 
Portugal and 0.5 in Spain (for a discussion, see ECB, 2003), prices seem to have risen too 
rapidly in these three countries and this has led to price competitiveness losses. Inflation was 
extremely low in Germany, which prevented other countries from restoring their price 
competitiveness. In 2007, inflation disparities remained large in the euro area: inflation stood 
at 1.6% in the three countries with the lowest inflation and at 2.9% in the countries with the 
highest inflation. Wage and price formation processes have not yet converged.  
The euro area includes countries with different development levels (table 6). Catching-up 
countries have structurally higher output growth and inflation than more ‘mature’ ones. Thus 
it is difficult to run a single monetary policy even in the absence of asymmetric shocks. With 
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a single nominal interest rate, euro area countries have had different real interest rates 
corrected for GDP growth (table 7). The single monetary policy was contractionary for 
Germany and Italy, expansionary for Ireland, Greece and Spain where companies and 
households had a strong incentive to borrow and invest, which boosted domestic GDP growth 
and inflation.  
Table 7. Inflation and real interest rates  
Inflation  
(GDP deflator) Real interest rate less GDP growth rate   
  1999-2007 1992-1998 1999-2007 
Euro area 2.0 2.5 0.0 
Belgium 1.9 1.6 0.25 
Germany 0.8 1.6 1.5 
Greece 3.2 6.7 -2.2 
Spain 3.9 2.1 -2.9 
France 1.8 2.9 0.2 
Ireland  3.5 -3.5 -5.2 
Italy 2.4 3.9 0.7 
Netherlands 2.6 0.9 -1.0 
Austria 1.5 1.3 0.5 
Portugal 3.1 1.6 -0.1 
Finland 1.4 1.3 -0.7 
UK 2.4 3.7 -0.5 
US 2.4 -0.1 -0.55 
Wage competition 
Wages as a share of GDP decreased by 2.3 percentage points at the euro area level between 
1999 and 2007 (table 8). The best performers were Austria (-4.4 percentage points), Spain (-
4.3), Germany (-3.9), and the Netherlands (-2.7). Increasing company profitability and price 
competitiveness through downwards pressure on wages became a major strategy in several 
countries, like in Germany. This strategy boosted exports but put a drag on domestic private 
consumption, thus dampening demand in the whole euro area. No attempt was made by 
Member States or the European Commission to harmonise wage growth.   
In this non-cooperative game, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands (and Sweden) succeeded in 
supporting domestic GDP growth through positive net exports contribution (by 1 percent of 
GDP per year for Germany and Austria). On the contrary, Spain, France and the UK suffered 
from a negative external contribution (table 9).  
Fixed exchange rates and rigid inflation rates induce persistent exchange rates misalignment 
periods. In the euro area, countries can no more devalue their currency. Wage moderation 
policies are the only tool left but take a long time to play and are painful, since they depress 
demand both at home and in the area. Wage moderation policies would be all the more 
difficult to implement in euro area countries that they are already implemented in Germany, 
where domestic inflation is very low which makes it harder for partner countries to gain 
competitiveness against Germany. 
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Table 8. Adjusted wage share in GDP, 1998/2007 
  Change in percentage points, 1998-2007 
Euro area -2.3 
Belgium -1.9 
Germany -3.9 
Greece -2.1 
Spain -4.3 
France -0.2 
Ireland  -2.1 
Italy -0.5 
Netherlands -2.7 
Austria -4.4 
Portugal -1.6 
Finland -0.9 
Denmark -0.8 
Sweden -0.1 
UK 0.6 
US -1.9 
Table 9. GDP and domestic demand, 1999-2007 
  GDP Domestic demand 
Euro area 2.1 1.7 
Belgium 2.3 2.0 
Germany 1.6 0.65 
Greece 4.1 4.2 
Spain 3.7 4.6 
France 2.2 2.7 
Ireland 6.6 6.15 
Italy 1.5 1.7 
Netherlands 2.5 2.0 
Austria 2.5 1.6 
Portugal 1.7 1.65 
Finland 3.4 3.1 
Denmark 1.9 2.1 
Sweden 3.2 2.6 
UK 2.8 3.5 
US 3.0 3.1 
 
In 2007, several countries ran substantial current account surpluses (table 10): the Netherlands 
(8.9 percent of GDP) and Germany (7.9), Finland (4.9), Belgium (3.5), and Austria (3.3) 
whereas some others ran large deficits: Portugal (-8.5 percent of GDP), Spain (-9.6) and 
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Greece (-12.5). The 260 billion euros surplus of Germany, Netherlands, Austria and Belgium 
and the 40 billion euros surplus of Nordic countries generate and finance the 180 billion euros 
deficit of Mediterranean countries and the 50 billion euros deficit of the new Member States 
(NMS).  
Table 10. Current account balances in 2007  
  Billion euros % of GDP 
Sweden 29.8 8.9 
Netherlands 48.6 8.1 
Germany 192.1 7.9 
Finland 7.3 4.9 
Belgium 12.8 3.5 
Austria 9.1 3.3 
Denmark 1.6 0.7 
Italy -27.7 -1.7 
Czech Republic -3.3 -1.9 
France -43.0 -2.2 
United Kingdom -55.1 -2.5 
Slovenia -1.6 -4.6 
Slovakia -2.8 -4.7 
Ireland -10.1 -5.3 
Hungary -6.6 -5.5 
Portugal -16.0 -8.5 
Spain -105.1 -9.6 
Greece -33.4 -12.5 
Romania -17.0 -13.1 
Lithuania -4.3 -13.1 
Estonia -2.8 -15.0 
Bulgaria -6.5 -21.3 
Latvia -4.8 -20.6 
Total -53.5 -2.5 
Source: IMF 
Do these current account divergences reflect an equilibrium process (oldest countries’ savings 
being invested in younger and more profitable countries) or a disequilibrium one (European 
savings being wasted in non-profitable investment, such as housing, in Southern countries)? 
In the euro area, this situation cannot be considered as optimal since real interest rates 
corrected for output growth differ across the area. Deficits can increase because they are not 
financed by financial markets but by transfers within the EU banking system and hence can 
hardly be visible. Foreign direct investments (FDI) cover only a small part of these deficits: In 
2005, Portugal received small net FDI amounts (1% of GDP), but net FDIs were negative for 
Spain (-1.4% of GDP) and Greece (-0.4%). National saving rates are very low in Greece, 
Spain and Portugal which is unusual for countries with rapid GDP growth. 
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The Germany-Netherlands-Austria versus Portugal-Spain-Greece relationship is the same at 
the euro area level than the US versus China relationship, with the same instability. It raises 
the same issues: how to convince ‘virtuous’ countries to spend more and to increase their real 
exchange rates so that ‘sinner’ countries can reduce their external deficits without depressing 
output? The financial crisis has made it impossible to continue debt accumulation. 
An inappropriate economic framework in the euro area 
The euro area economic framework embeds three elements. The Stability and Growth Pact is 
the only component where the Commission has effective disciplinary powers. But it is poorly 
designed (see Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2003 and 2006): 
1.  Its numerical rules (3% of GDP limit for deficits, 60% of GDP for public debts, 
medium-term equilibrium of public finances) have no economic basis; 
2.  They do not allow the Commission to influence MS policies in good economic times, 
when fiscal efforts should and could be made;   
3.  They do not allow to implement measures against countries running too restrictive 
policies;  
4.  They do not account for current account balances, competitiveness, private debts, real 
or financial bubbles. 
The economic policy coordination process (under the Articles 121 and 136 of the TFEU) is 
purely formal. There are no concerted macroeconomic strategies in the short or medium-term, 
adapted to the circumstances and specificities of each country.  
The structural reforms programmes consisted mainly in goods, labour and financial markets 
liberalisation. The Commission put pressure on MS to introduce these reforms, which allowed 
national governments to invoke this pressure to impose unpopular reforms. The Lisbon 
agenda which was adopted by EU technocracies, without any open public debate, did not 
succeed in actually influencing national debates and economic policies, nor in impulsing a 
common economic strategy. Moreover, the crisis has undermined the relevance of these 
programmes. Is competition policy more important than industrial and innovation policies? 
Should Europe maintain the objective of financial markets full liberalisation?  
3. Fiscal policy during the crisis 
Current fiscal imbalances have been caused by the 2007-2009 economic crisis which led 
output to fall 6% to 10% below pre-crisis trends. The improvements in net public debts levels 
achieved between 1998 and 2007 were lost for many countries (table 11).  
The situation has less deteriorated in the euro area than in the UK, US, and Japan. For 
instance, public deficits are expected to reach 6.6 percent of GDP in the euro area in 2010, 
against 11.5 percent of GDP in the UK, 10.7 in the US, 7.6 in Japan (table 15). 
 
European Debt Crisis and Fiscal Exit Strategies 
 12
 
Table 11. Net public debts in % of GDP 
  1998 2007 2010 
United States 45 43 67 
Japan 46 82 115 
United Kingdom 33 29 53 
Euro Area 54 43 59 
Germany 37 43 55 
France 41 34 57 
Italy 107 87 104 
Spain 54 19 44 
Netherlands 48 28 34 
Belgium 108 73 83 
Austria 37 31 41 
Greece 73 72 98 
Portugal 33 44 63 
Finland -15 -73 -57 
Ireland 42 0 40 
OECD 43 38 58 
 
It is not easy to assess the amount of national stimulus plans. Output fell so abruptly that it is 
difficult to assess potential output. The ex ante impact on public finances is also difficult to 
measure due to the large output fall (which has non-linear effects on some tax revenues) and 
to the drop in asset prices.  
The euro area public deficit widened by 6.0 percentage points from 2007 to 2010 (8.2 in the 
UK and 7.9 in the US). Under the assumptions that the crisis does not affect potential growth 
and that the cyclical balance equals 50% of the output gap, the fiscal impulse cumulated from 
2007 to 2009 would amount to 5 percent of GDP in the US, 4.5 in the UK, and 1.9 in the euro 
area (table 12). The fiscal stimulus was much lower in the euro area than in the other large 
industrial economies. Our estimates are lower than the European Commission’s ones, which 
embed a large fall in potential growth due to the financial crisis.  
Large increases in public deficits and debts did not lead to higher interest rates because they 
only offset the collapse of private debts and the rise in private savings. In the US, the 10-year 
Treasury bonds rate fell from 4% in July 2008 to 2.2% in December, rise to 3.7 in January 
2010, then fell to 2.7 in September. In Germany, the 10-year government bonds rate fell from 
4.6% in July 2008 to 3.0% in mid-2009, rose to 3.2% in January 2010, but fell to 2.25 in 
September (figure 1). In April 2010, 10-year government bond interest rates remained near 
GDP growth and inflation anticipated for the 10 coming years by Consensus forecasts for all 
large industrial economies (table 12). Hence high public debts cannot be said to announce 
higher future interest rates. 
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Table 12. Fiscal impulses (cumulated since 2007)  
  2008 2009 2010 
Belgium 0.6 (0.4) 2.4 (2.8) 1.2 (1.4) 
Germany 0.2 (0.5) 1.2 (0.5) 3.3 (2.7) 
Ireland 4.0 (1.9) 5.9 (2.4) 3.6 (-5.5) 
Greece* 1.7 (1.3) 5.3 (3.7) -2.8 (-4.3) 
Spain 4.3 (5.2) 9.3 (8.8) 7.8 (5.5) 
France 0.1 (-0.4) 2.9 (1.6) 2.7 (1.4) 
Italy 0.6 (-0.6) 1.7 (-1.1) 1.1 (-1.3) 
Netherlands -0.2 (-0.6) 3.5 (2.2) 2.9 (2.5) 
Austria 0.4 (0.2) 1.8 (1.2) 2.0 (2.0) 
Portugal 0.5 (-1.0) 4.7 (3.2) 3.8 (0.4) 
Finland 1.0 (-0.3) 3.0 (2.1) 4.1 (2.5) 
Euro area 0.6 (0.6) 2.5 (1.9) 3.0 (1.7) 
UK 1.3 (1.3) 4.8 (4.6) 3.7 (3.4) 
US 2.8 (2.5) 5.6 (4.8) 5.7 (4.3) 
Japan -0.4 (-1.9) 1.9 (-0.2) 2.2 (0.7) 
Source: European Commission, with own calculations of output gap in bold; * in Autumn 2009. 
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Table 13. 10-year government bonds interest rates and 10-year expectations from Consensus 
Forecasts in June 2010 
  10-year rates GDP* Inflation* Real interest rate less GDP growth  
US 3.8 2.8 2.2 -1.2 
Japan 1.3 1.4 0.8 -0.9 
UK 4.0 2.3 2.4 -0.7 
Germany 3.05 1.4 1.6 0.05 
France 3.4 1.9 1.85 -0.35 
Italy 3.9 1.2 1.7 1.0 
Netherlands 3.3 2.3 2.4 -1.4 
* 10 year growth expectations according to Consensus Forecasts (June 2010). 
Markets do not believe in an inflationary risk: expected inflation derived from the comparison 
of non-indexed and price-indexed bonds interest rates stands currently at around 1.8% at a 10-
year horizon in the US like in the euro area.  
Figure 2. Inflation expectations 
 
Sources: AFT, US Federal Reserve. 
 
Three scenarios can be considered for the coming years:  
1. In the grey scenario, domestic demand does not accelerate, GDP growth remains low 
and there is no factor pushing inflation or interest rates up.  
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strong rise in tax revenues and a fall in some public expenditure; governments reduce 
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3. In the red scenario, private demand accelerates but governments maintain excessive 
deficits which lead to higher inflation and hence higher interest rates.  
The red scenario is not currently anticipated by markets. Markets anticipate probably the grey 
one, without tensions on interest rates or inflation.  
A technical issue which becomes a political one… 
The assessment of the size of the structural deficit and of the fiscal effort needed when fiscal 
policy will focus on reducing deficits, depend on potential output estimates, or in other words 
of the maximum output level achievable without inflationary pressures. However, the EC-DG 
Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) and the OECD have substantially lowered their 
estimates of potential output levels and growth since the crisis (table 14).  
These revisions also apply to the pre-crisis period. The euro area potential growth estimate for 
2000-2007 was reduced by 0.3% per year by the OECD, and by 0.4% per year by the DG 
ECFIN. The potential output estimate for 2009 was lowered by 3.5% by the OECD, by 5.4% 
by the DG ECFIN. Euro area potential growth would be 0.9% only per year in 2009-2011 
according to the DG ECFIN.   
Table 14. Potential growth and output gap estimates  
 Output gap Potential output growth 
 2007 2000-2007 2008 2009 2011 
Estimate in… 2007 2009  2007 2009  2007  2009 2007 2009 2009 
…by OECD                   
US  0.4 1.0 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.5 1.5 1.7 
Japan  0.2 3.5 1.4 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.9 
Germany  0.0 2.6 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.0 0.8 
France -0.3 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.7 2.0 1.7 1.0 
Euro area -0.3 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.7 2.0 1.2 1.0 
UK  0.4 1.8 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.4 2.7 1.5 0.9 
…DG ECFIN                   
Germany  0.3 2.7 1.2 1.0 1.8 1.0 1.9 0.7 1.2 
France -0.3 1.9 2.1 1.8 2.0 1.5 2.1 1.2 1.4 
Euro area -0.2 2.5 2.1 1.7 2.1 1.2 2.2 0.8 1.0 
UK -0.1 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.5 1.5 2.7 0.8 1.1 
 
In 2007, France had an unemployment rate of 8.4% without inflationary pressures. The 
Commission considered that France had a negative output gap of 0.3%. Can it be said two 
years later that the French economy was in fact running 2.2% above capacity in 2007 and that 
the equilibrium unemployment rate was at around 10.5%?  
These new estimates have significantly increased the size of structural deficits. In 2010, the 
French output gap is -2.5% according to new potential output estimates; -7.0% according to 
the previous ones. The primary structural deficit would be 4.5% in the first case, 2.2% in the 
second. The efforts needed to lower the structural deficit are quite different.  
At the end of 2010, the euro area unemployment rate is expected to reach 10.5 % (i.e. about 
3% above the equilibrium unemployment rate); labour productivity losses relatively to labour 
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productivity trend will amount to 3.5% (i.e. a 3.5% excess in labour force); the number of 
discouraged workers will be around 1%. Should these 7.5% be considered as permanently 
lost?  
What will the euro area GDP growth target be in the coming years: 2.2% or 1.0% per year? 
There is a risk that choosing a low target becomes self-fulfilling, if as soon as GDP grows by 
more than 1%, restrictive fiscal policies are implemented. For instance, according to the 
Commission’s statement of November 2009, MS should initiate a ‘fiscal consolidation policy’ 
in 2011 because GDP growth projections (1.5%) are significantly higher than potential 
growth (1%). But should MS accept this 7.5 % loss in activity as permanent? 
These uncertainties are questioning the potential growth concept and its use for economic 
policy. Is potential growth is independent of actual growth, and if so why did the OECD and 
the Commission lower their potential growth estimates by such an extent after the crisis? Or 
potential growth estimates depend on actual GDP growth: a recession leads to a decline in 
investment, thus to lower production capacity, to a decrease in potential labour force (as older 
workers, the young, mothers with young children stop looking for a job) and to lower 
productivity gains. Should we conclude that any rise in demand should be avoided or that, on 
the contrary, MS need strong growth to boost output capacity, to provide incentives to 
discouraged workers to come back to the labour market and to prevent their working skills 
from deteriorating? The euro area can not resign to a 10% unemployment rate.  
Economic policy should aim first at reducing the current output gap, and then to bring GDP 
growth back to around 2% by year. The OECD and DG ECFIN estimates should not be used 
to define targets or constrain public deficits since they are volatile and not reliable. 
What structural deficits in 2010? 
During the 2007-09 crisis, public finances suffered from the automatic fall in tax revenues 
and from the rise in some public expenditure such as unemployment benefits (the cyclical 
deficit), from measures implemented to support activity (the discretionary deficit), and from 
specific measures to support the financial sector.  
The magnitude of the recession (whose impact was particularly large on some taxes) and its 
characteristics (falling property and equity prices also contributed to the decline in tax 
revenues) make it difficult to assess the size of structural deficits in 2010.  
In 2009/2010, the rise in deficits is partly due to temporary stimulus packages and to the 
overreaction of tax revenues. These should not be included in the structural deficit. 
According to our estimates, the euro area deficit would amount to 5.7 percent of GDP in 
2011, of which: 4.5 percentage points in cyclical deficit, 2.8 percentage points in interest 
payments and 1.6 percentage points in structural primary surplus. The structural primary 
surplus did not decrease since 2007 (table 15).  
Let us assume that the objective is to stabilise public debt at 80% of GDP. The euro area long-
term real interest rate was on average 0.4 percentage points higher than GDP growth between 
1997 and 2007. So the euro area needs to run a structural primary surplus of 0.3 percent of 
GDP. No major effort is needed. The cyclical deficit must be reduced via GDP growth, which 
should remain higher than the 2% potential growth for a long time in order to reduce the 8 
percent of GDP negative output gap. Euro area countries have to address a GDP growth issue, 
not a public finance one. 
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Table 15. Public finances in the euro area  
% of GDP except *  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GDP growth, in %* 2.7 0.5 -4.1 1.2 1.8 
Output gap based on pre-crisis trend 0.0 -1.6 -7.8 -8.7 -9.0 
Government balance -0.6 -2.0 -6.3 -6.6 -5.7 
Net interest payments 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.8 
Cyclical balance  -0.8 -3.9 -4.3 -4.5 
Stimulus packages  -0.2 -1.3 -0.8  
Overreaction of tax revenues   -0.7 -0.4  
Structural primary balance 2.0 1.6 2.1 1.5 1.6 
Cumulated fiscal impulse 0.0 0.6 1.2 1.3 0.4 
Gross debt 66.4 69.8 78.7 84.6 86.5 
 
Due to the uncertainties around the output gap estimates, it is difficult to evaluate the 
structural primary balance (SPB, table 16). If we consider the OECD measure, the SPB is 
negative: -1.7 percent of GDP in the euro area (but larger than -5 percent in Spain and 
Ireland), -6 percent in the UK and -5 in Japan, -7 in the US. If we consider that it is possible 
for the economies to fully recover from the crisis, then the SPB is nil for the euro area; it 
remains negative by 3 percent of GDP or more for Spain, Ireland, the UK, Japan and the US. 
Table 16. Public finances stability in 2010 
  Public balance Primary public balance Output gap* 
Structural primary 
balance** 
Germany -5.4 -3.1 -4.4/-6.3 -1.2/0.1 
France -7.8 -5.6 -4.0/-7.7 -3.2/-1.7 
Italy -5.2 -0.6 -4.6/-11.0 1.8/4.9 
Spain -9.4 -8.0 -5.3/-11.2 -5.2/-2.4 
Netherlands -6.4 -4.6 -3.8/-6.1 -2.0/-1.4 
Greece -8.1 -3.7 -8.0/-13.0 -1.0/-2.8 
Belgium -6.1 -2.6 -6.9/-6.6 1.9/0.7 
Austria -4.7 -2.5 -3.5/-6.4 -1.1/0.7 
Portugal -7.4 -4.1 -4.0/-9.3 -2.8/0.5 
Finland -3.8 -4.2 -8.0/-13.0 -0.4/2.5 
Ireland -11.7 -9.0 -8.9/-25.8 -8.3/-3.9 
Euro area -6.6 -4.0 -4.7/-8.7 -1.7/0.3 
United Kingdom -11.5 -9.6 -6.2/-10.7 -5.7/-4.3 
United States -10.7 -8.8 -3.2/-6.4 -7.1/-5.6 
Japan -7.6 -6.3 -3.1/-7.1 -5.0/-2.8 
* OECD estimation/Before crisis trend. ** According to the two output gap measures. 
 
Required fiscal efforts depend on the output gap estimate, and on the real interest rate 
corrected from GDP growth. If a country pays interest payments at interest rates close its 
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GDP growth rate and if the objective of a full recovery is credible, then the required effort is 
low, even nil at the euro area level. If a country has to stabilise its debt with an interest rate 3 
percentage point higher than its GDP growth rate and if it has to resign to the output gap as 
measured by the OECD, then the required effort is large: for instance, 5.2 percent of GDP for 
Spain (rather than 2.4 percent), 1.7 percent for the Euro Zone (rather than 0).  
We do not deny that some EU countries will have to change their GDP growth regime where 
it was unsustainable: Germany and the Netherlands (too high external surpluses), Greece, 
Spain and Portugal (too large external deficits), Finland and Ireland (too much reliance on 
foreign markets), UK (too much dependent on the financial sector). These changes will be 
painful and will take a long time, but the problem is not fundamentally a fiscal one. Even if 
these changes will reduce potential output in some countries (mainly Ireland, Greece and 
Finland), the impact on the euro area potential output should be small. There is no evidence 
that euro area potential output should be really affected in the medium term. 
In a pink scenario, GDP growth will recover in 2012 and this will lower public deficits (table 
17); the negative fiscal impulse will be small (0.4 percent of GDP per year); public deficits 
will remain close to 3 percent of GDP in 2013/2014; public debts close to 90 percent of GDP. 
This scenario is fragile: it assumes a strong recovery of private or external demand; it assumes 
that MS will resist EC’s or financial markets’ pressures for more rapid cuts in public deficits. 
Table 17. Euro area public finances: a pink scenario  
% of GDP except *  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP, in %* 1.8 2.6 3.0 3.0 2.5 
Output gap  -9.0 -8.2 -7.6 -6.6 -5.6 
Government balance -5.7 -5.1 -4.7 -3.9 -3.0 
Net interest payments 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 
Cyclical balance -4.5 -4.1 -3.8 -3.3 -2.8 
Structural primary balance 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2 
Public debt 86.5 87.6 87.9 87.4 86.5 
4. About fiscal exit strategies 
The IMF views  
During the crisis, the IMF has exhorted governments to undertake large stimulus programmes. 
Nevertheless, two IMF economists, Cottarelli and Viñals (2009), proposed an exit strategy 
which is not satisfactory. They argued that public debts should come back to their pre-crisis 
levels, but without providing any analysis of optimal debt levels. The authors write that we 
must avoid that ‘concerns about deficits and debt levels cause a rise in interest rates’, but rates 
have generally not increased. They proposed that countries adopt a 60 percent of GDP debt 
ratio target in 2030. But why this level?   
They estimate that structural primary balance is -3.5 percent of GDP in 2010 in advanced 
countries (including 1.5 percentage point of temporary fiscal stimulus). But where do the 
other two percentage points of structural deficit come from? In our view, they come from an 
under-estimation of the cyclical deficit by the IMF (by not accounting for the over-reaction of 
tax revenues, by underestimating potential output). The authors estimate that primary 
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balances should rise to 4.5 percent of GDP in 2020 for debt ratios to reach 60 percent of GDP, 
which requires a negative fiscal impulse of 0.8 percent per year. Their policies would lead to 
large public surpluses and public debts would disappear in 2040, but the authors do not give 
evidence that a world without public debts is possible. 
According to the IMF (2010), advanced economies should return to pre-crisis debt levels, 
because there is a link between the public debt level and the real interest rate level (and a link 
between the interest rate level and the potential growth rate). But the first link does not hold if 
public debt is high because private debt is low and because private agents want to hold public 
debt. It does not hold if central banks maintain low real interest rates and governments 
maintain public deficits required to sustain activity. There is no evidence that real interest 
rates will increase due to excessive public debts and deficits. The econometric results mix 
autonomous and stabilisation deficits.  
In fact, even with an interest rate 0.5 percentage point higher than output growth, a primary 
public surplus of around 0.5 percent of GDP would stabilise public debt at the level reached 
in 2010 (around 90 percent of GDP): the required effort (after the end of fiscal stimuli and 
revenues overshooting) is only around 0.5 percent of GDP.  
The authors do not analyse the impact of this restrictive policy on growth. They must assume 
implicitly that there will be a private spending deficit and an investment or consumption 
boom, but we do not see why such a boom would occur and the authors do not say explicitly 
that the fiscal adjustment strategy depends on this boom. 
The evaluation of fiscal multipliers remains controversial. We are in a situation where we 
cannot expect lower interest rates or exchange rates to offset the impact of restrictive fiscal 
policies. If we assume that fiscal policy has a multiplier of 2.0 at the world level, a negative 
impulse of 0.8 percent of GDP will decrease GDP by 1.6% and will not improve government 
balances.  
Of course, the authors advocate for structural reforms (more competitive goods markets, 
removal of labour market and tax distortions, but no financial markets reforms), but recognise 
that: ‘there is too much uncertainty on both the magnitude and timing of the effects of 
structural reform on potential growth to build a fiscal adjustment strategy primarily around 
this’.  
Of course, they advocate for ‘fiscal rules and fiscal councils’. However, the crisis has shown 
that fiscal policy cannot obey automatic rules and must be decided by a political government, 
with determination and courage that will never be the characteristic of a committee of experts. 
They propose to keep health and pensions spending constant in relation to GDP, but 
households would have to pay premiums to private financial institutions to obtain a satisfying 
coverage. The authors do not give evidence that this will be less expensive. It would be 
somewhat ironical that the financial crisis leads to the development of pension funds, while 
the crisis has shown their fragility. The issue of the desirable social spending level has 
nothing to do with the macroeconomic management of public deficits, if such expenses are 
structurally financed by social contributions. A country may decide to keep its public pension 
system, to arbitrate between pension levels, social contribution rates and retirement age.  
The authors propose to freeze all other primary public spending in real terms, which 
implicitly supposes that these expenditures are less useful than private ones, which remains to 
be proven. It is difficult to understand why the financial crisis should lead to a decrease in the 
share of public spending in GDP.  
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Blanchard (2010) made two suggestions. Central banks should have an inflation target of 4%, 
to allow for a more pronounced decrease in anticipated real interest rates during depression 
periods. But, as the Japanese case showed, it is difficult to raise inflation expectations in a 
context of depression. Governments would have more rooms of manoeuvre in depressed 
situations if they had a smaller public debt in good times. So Blanchard claims for a long 
period of public surpluses. But how will demand be sustained during this period? Blanchard 
does not study what the optimal level of public debt is. If people wish to accumulate safe 
financial assets, then the public sector has to offer such assets. Blanchard does not propose 
any measure to reduce the world economy instability induced by the weight, greed and 
blindness of financial markets.  
Cottarelli and Blanchard ‘Ten commendmants’ (June 2010) are neither useful nor new: 
credible long-term plans to reduce public deficits and debt ratios, public expenditures cuts 
rather than tax increases, social expenditure cuts, structural reforms. 
The OECD views  
The OECD views are very close to the IMF ones (see OECD, 2009, 2010). The OECD 
underestimates output gaps in 2010 and potential output growth. It overestimates structural 
primary deficits: 7 percent of GDP in the US in 2010 against 1.4 percent in 2007; 4.4 per cent 
in the euro area against 1.1 percent in 2007 (in autumn 2008, the OECD estimated that the 
euro area had a structural primary surplus of 1.6 percent of GDP). The OECD estimates that 
‘excess supply of government bonds may put upward pressure on interest rates’. But there is 
currently no ‘excess supply’. 
The OECD calls for tightening fiscal policies (by 1 percent of GDP per year from 2012 to 
2017) to avoid households’ Ricardian behaviours and to reassure financial markets, while 
recognising that these policies will dampen growth. But should fiscal policy be used to 
reassure financial markets?  
Should we fear Ricardian behaviour? The actual rise in public deficits is cyclical; it is not due 
to structural public spending increases or tax cuts. So taxes will not have to rise. It is the 
increase in activity which should bring budgetary positions back to balance. But we must 
admit that the rise in deficits generates a climate of uncertainty. Companies and workers may 
fear that governments will be obliged to reduce too quickly their deficits, which may have a 
depressive effect. Governments need to explain that budgetary positions will be brought back 
to balance thanks to higher output growth, not through higher taxation or social expenditures 
cuts. Paradoxically, it is the OECD-type discourse for rapid consolidation which may induce 
Ricardian behaviours.  
The OECD recommends a coordination of fiscal consolidation strategies, as consolidation in 
one country will decrease activity in partner countries. But coordination is not possible if all 
countries have to consolidate at the same time.   
According to the OECD, the effect could be reduced through structural reforms (fewer 
regulations on labour and goods markets, lower taxes, while no financial market reforms are 
proposed).  
The OECD recommends social spending (health and pensions) cuts rather than tax increases.  
Should we hide a social choice (lower public spending) behind questionable economic 
considerations (social spending cuts would be less harmful to activity than tax increases 
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because they would induce people to work contrary to taxation)? Can structural reforms 
effectively increase supply when there is a lack of demand?  
The OECD estimates that pension reforms could have a triple dividend: improving public 
finances, decreasing households’ savings (since people will have to plan to work longer, and 
so will need to save less for retirement) and so deman, increasing labour supply and so 
potential growth. But the effect can be the opposite: people will save more as public pensions 
will decrease and as they will fear to be unemployed for a long period of time before they 
retire.  
Two European economist views  
In October 2009, two distinguished European economists were invited to give papers at the 
ECOFIN meeting at Göteborg.  
Giavazzi (2009), who is usually against active fiscal policies, recognised that such policies 
were effective during the crisis because they were associated with accommodative monetary 
policy and because the output gap was largely negative (but it is precisely in these 
circumstances that a fiscal stimulus is needed). According to the author, governments should 
announce that they will end the fiscal stimulus when the output gap comes back to zero to 
reassure financial markets and the ECB and to avoid a rise in interest rates. But who doubts 
about this? Long-term interest rates did not generally increase during the crisis.  
Giavazzi proposes cuts in future public retirement pensions to show the credibility of this 
announcement. At the same time, he recognises that there is a need to induce households 
resume spending. How is it possible if households have to save more in view of their 
pensions?  
According to Giavazzi, public debts should return to their pre-crisis levels, but can this be 
achieved if households want to own more public debt assets? Giavazzi proposes to 
counterbalance the fall in potential output by increasing labour force participation through 
labour taxation cuts. But, in a mass unemployment situation, is employment really 
constrained by the unwillingness of people to work? 
Pisani-Ferry (2009) presented again his old and unwise proposals. He asked for a commitment 
by governments to undertake consolidation strategies, according to “fiscal sustainability 
plans” which would be implemented from 2011 to 2014, with debt targets for 2014. But how 
to design these plans independently of the economic context? One finds again the failure of 
the Stability and Growth Pact: a country cannot make commitments five years ahead and 
renounce to adjust its fiscal policy according to circumstances. Pisani-Ferry proposes to 
establish ‘independent Budgetary Councils’ to monitor the development of public finances, 
but what is their political and scientific legitimacy? He proposes to reduce public pensions.  
Pisani-Ferry fears that expansionary fiscal policies will provoke inflationary pressures, which 
will induce the ECB to increase too quickly interest rates and so coordination is needed. But 
this fear is not justified: inflation will accelerate only if there is a strong recovery of demand 
which is unlikely in the years to come. It would not be wise that, to avoid an imaginary 
danger (resurgence of inflation), governments gave up the struggle against a present 
imbalance (unemployment). Economic policies coordination should not be designed to oblige 
countries to achieve arbitrary public finances criteria under the pressure from the Commission 
and the ECB. 
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The European Commission view  
During the crisis, the Commission submitted 24 of the 27 EU countries to the excessive 
deficit procedure. The Commission applied SGP rules with flexibility for 2009 and 2010, but 
the crisis shows that these rules are inappropriate.  
On 20 October 2009, the ECOFIN Council recognised that ‘it is not yet time to withdraw the 
government support’, but announced that it will prepare ‘a coordinated fiscal exit strategy’. 
But which coordination? Consolidation should start in 2011 at the latest and go beyond the 
benchmark of 0.5 percent of GDP per year. But the Council did not explain what countries 
should do if the recovery is not sufficient in 2011. The positive point is that the SGP and its 
3% of GDP constraints are forgotten in the short and medium run. The ECB requested 
consolidation to begin in 2011, whatever the economic situation, and amount to at least 1 
percent of GDP by year.  
In November 2009, the Commission requested countries with higher than 3 percent of GDP 
public deficits to bring their deficits below this limit in 2012, 2013 or 2014, according to 
some arbitrary criteria. The deadlines are long but it remains unrealistic to set fiscal policies 
constraints independently of economic developments. Is it useful to require MS to commit to 
bring their public deficit below 3% of GDP in 2013 rather than in 2014, when deficit figures 
depend on the strength of private demand, which neither the Commission nor MS can 
control? MS should refuse to make commitments on the precise level of their future deficits 
and debts, independently of growth developments.  
One can be worried when the Commission declares that consolidation should be implemented 
as soon as growth is above potential growth, estimated at only 1% per year.  
The Commission writes: ‘The SGP should be an anchor for fiscal exit strategies’, even if the 
crisis has shown that a pact focused on a blind constraint on public deficits should be replaced 
by a fiscal policies coordination process accounting for the necessities of economic 
stabilisation. 
The Commission continues to call for wage restraints, as if wage increases were responsible 
for the crisis. However, the wage share in value added declined by 2.3 percentage points in 
the euro area from 2000 to 2007. The Commission does not consider that growth should be 
based on wages and social benefits and not on competitiveness or financial bubbles.  
The Commission keeps on repeating that public debts should come down to 60% of GDP. But 
the crisis increases the need for households to own safe assets, especially to finance their 
pensions (as the Commission advocates also for lower public pensions). Companies are 
reluctant to borrow in view of the risk premium embedded in today's interest rates. The public 
debt equilibrium level has increased due to the crisis. Debts cannot come down to their pre-
crisis levels.  
Fiscal policy cannot be managed on its own, with arbitrary rules. It must aim at maintaining 
(or reaching) the desirable employment level while allowing for inflation and interest rates to 
stay at satisfactory levels. Public debts and deficits must be derived from this target. The ‘exit 
strategy’ should be that central banks maintain low interest rates and that Governments 
maintain public deficits as long as they are necessary to sustain activity. If private demand 
increases significantly in the coming years, it will be necessary to reduce public deficits (and 
this will be largely automatic). If private demand stagnates, i.e. if companies refuse to borrow 
and if households want to save, it will be necessary to maintain some public deficits and to 
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accept some rise in public debts. It makes no sense to project public debts and deficits 
independently of private demand developments and to worry about the excessive level of 
public debts (as Cecchetti and al. (2010) or Becker and al. (2010)): public debts will be high 
if there is a demand for public debt. There is no evidence that public debts will be excessive. 
MS strategies… 
In their 2010 Stability programmes, all euro area countries have accepted the assumption 
according to which the crisis dramatically reduced their potential output growth. The average 
of national estimates gives a euro area potential output growth of 1.0 % only en 2010, 1.2% in 
2011, 1.4% in 2014.  
In 2010, all countries have to choose between reducing public deficits in order to prevent a 
too large increase in public debt and pursuing expansionary policies as the recovery remains 
weak (table 18). Germany (2.4 percent of GDP), Austria (1.2) and Finland (0.4) maintain a 
positive fiscal impulse. It is a good configuration that the less constrained countries sustain 
EU activity. On the contrary, Greece (-8 percent of GDP), Ireland (-5.7), Spain (-3.3) and 
Portugal (-2.8) have been obliged to undertake restrictive fiscal policies. On the whole, fiscal 
policy should be slightly in the euro area. 
Table 18. Fiscal impulses, in 2010-11 
 Fiscal balance* Fiscal impulse** 
 2009 2010 2011 2010 2011 
Germany -3.3 -5.4 -4.5 2.2 -0.8 
France -7.6 -7.8 -6.4 0.0 -1.7 
Italy -5.2 -5.2 -4.2 -0.2 -0.5 
Spain -11.2 -9.4 -6.0 -3.3 -3.6 
Netherlands -5.3 -6.3 -5.0 0.2 -1.5 
Belgium -6.1 -4.9 -4.2 -1.4 -0.9 
Austria -3.4 -4.7 -4.0 0.8 -0.6 
Portugal -9.4 -7.4 -4.6 -2.8 -3.9 
Finland -2.4 -3.8 -3.0 0.4 -1.3 
Ireland -14.3 -11,7 -10.8 -5.7 -2.0 
Greece -13.8 -8.1 -7.1 -8.0 -3.8 
Euro area -6.3 -6.6 -5.7 -0.2 -1.7 
United Kingdom -11.3 -11.5 -10.3 -1.2 -1.8 
United States -11.1 -10.7 -8.9 -0.5 -2.0 
Japan -7.2 -7.6 -8.3 0.9 0.7 
*According to National Stability Programmes (2010); **The first number gives our evaluation based on trend potential 
growth; the second gives, for EU countries, the national evaluation as in their 2010 Stability Programme. Source: National SP 
(2010) or OECD, OFCE calculations. 
 
For 2011, all countries announce restrictive fiscal policies, often by more than 1 percent of 
GDP. In the euro area the fiscal effort would be 1.6 percent of GDP; 1.8 in the UK and 2 in 
the US. This raises three questions: will countries be able to reduce strongly public 
expenditure? What will be the impact of simultaneous restrictive fiscal plans on activity? 
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Some economists have exhibited cases where restrictive fiscal policies do not have a negative 
impact on economic activity. But in the present situation, we can neither expect lower interest 
rates nor exchange rate depreciation nor a private demand boom. What is the macroeconomic 
logic of these strategies? They seem to accept the assumption that potential output is durably 
smaller, but why? If the euro area as a whole does not have excess demand, the restrictive 
policies needed to be run by some countries should be offset by more expansionary policies in 
the other countries.  
However, many countries have already decided or were obliged to cut strongly public 
spending. Some countries (Netherlands, Ireland, UK) cut social benefits. Some countries 
(Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal) cut public servants wages; most cut the number of public 
servants. Some countries (Greece, Ireland, Spain, UK) reduce public investment. Some 
countries (Spain, Germany) announced that the retirement age will be postponed until 67 even 
if there is no evidence that most workers will be able to work until this age, so the aim is to 
decrease pension’s levels. Some countries (Greece, Spain, Belgium and Portugal) strongly 
increased taxes.  
Some countries have tightened the constraints on fiscal policy. Hence Germany has adopted a 
law creating a "debt brake", which prohibits any structural deficit higher than 0.35% (?) of 
GDP from 2016, the cyclical deficit being estimated by the Commission method, which is 
questionable, as we have already seen. According to this method, the German structural 
deficit would almost always been excessively each year since 1974. But can one believe that a 
country with a higher than 6.5% of GDP current account surplus, a higher than 8% 
unemployment rate and a 1.5% inflation rate had excessive deficits?  
Exceptions can exist for ‘natural disaster or exceptional economic circumstances’. They must 
be voted in parliament with a majority of two thirds. The law creates an ‘adjustment notional 
account’ where the amount of public deficits exceeding 0.35% will be cumulated (due to 
market conditions or poor execution of the budget). These overruns are to be depreciated 
through good times or by a discretionary policy. The liability of the account will be limited to 
1.5% of GDP. 
This rule is not satisfactory. In the short term, everything depends on the definition of 
‘exceptional circumstances’. In case of lower growth, the constraint on fiscal policy will 
depend heavily on the calculation of potential growth. In the long term, considering that 
Germany may have a trend growth of 3% per annum in nominal terms, a deficit of 0.35% of 
GDP would bring long-term public debt to 12% of GDP. Is this realistic? In the transitional 
period, German fiscal policy should be very restrictive from 2011 (when the structural deficit 
is 3.5% according to the Commission) to 2016, whatever the circumstances. 
In March 2010 the French government settled a Commission to propose a target rule for 
public finances. The Commission excluded wise rules, like the golden rule or the stabilisation 
of debt to GDP ratio, and proposed instead the equilibrium of the structural balance.  
On 20 May the French President proposed a constitutional reform that would ‘require each 
elected Government to commit for five years on a path of structural balance, as well as on the 
date where the equilibrium of public finances should be achieved’. Future governments would 
not be allowed to increase the structural deficit. 
In fact, the general government balance is affected by economic circumstances that no 
government controls. In January 2009, the French government settled in the Stability 
Programme the objective of bringing the deficit down to 1.1% of GDP in 2012. In January 
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2010, this target rose to 4.6%. Does the actual government regret not to have kept the January 
2009 target? It makes no sense to request governments to make unrealistic commitments, 
even more to stick with them. 
It seems difficult to introduce in the Constitution a vague economic concept like ‘structural 
balance’, to prohibit any discretionary fiscal measure, to oblige future governments to set a 
structural balance target. The project does not explain how to react after substantial changes in 
the estimation of potential output growth and structural balance, as we could observe in 2009. 
The crisis will certainly oblige governments to run fiscal policy in a more transparent way. 
Governments will have to specify temporary stimulus measures as such, to announce their 
growth target and their structural public balance target (but the target must be the golden rule 
of public finance, not the equilibrium). But EU MS should not deprive themselves of policy 
tools that were helpful during the crisis.  
Three fears  
EU governments and the Commission have been obliged to implement fiscal stimulus 
packages during the crisis. But they do not draw all lessons from the crisis. Instead of 
questioning the responsibility of past policies in the emergence of the crisis, they demand a 
return to such policies as if nothing had happened!  
Also, the debate on fiscal exit strategies now raises three fears. The first is that the rise in 
deficits and debts during the crisis leads some governments to implement restrictive policies 
too early, which would weigh heavily on the recovery. EU countries should forget about 
deficit and public debt targets and adopt unemployment rates targets. No restrictive fiscal 
policies should be run as long as unemployment rates do not come down at a sufficient pace 
to full employment.  
The second fear is that fiscal austerity leads MS to abandon growth-enhancing public 
expenditure such as R&D, education, support for innovative industries and for the green 
economy. 
The third fear is that public finances problems are used as a pretext for introducing large 
public spending cuts (especially social spending), which is a structural target of the European 
technocracy. However, no excessive increase in social spending can be blamed for current 
deficits.  
It would be a disaster for EU cohesion that EU authorities use the threat of markets to impose 
restrictive economic policies, liberal reforms and social spending cuts to countries and people. 
Policies aiming at reducing the welfare system would be socially and economically 
dangerous. They would lower households’ incomes and raise their savings rates. How to 
offset falling demand: by a new financial bubble? Households would have to buy individually 
their health and pensions insurances from financial institutions which are responsible for the 
crisis.  
Should we undermine the European social model which showed its effectiveness during the 
crisis? The crisis highlighted the risks arising from growing inequalities, which advocates for 
higher taxes on highest incomes, highest wealth, financial and real estate earnings, and on 
financial sectors, if public deficits have to be reduced. This should be allowed by fighting 
against ‘tax and regulation heavens’ and by more tax coordination.  
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5. Public finances and financial markets  
Since the beginning of 2010, financial markets have found a new matter of concern: deficits 
and public debts levels. All advanced countries, even the largest, are suspected of being able 
to default on their debt (table 19). Bankers, rating agencies and investment funds pretend to 
worry about the sustainability of public finances and require countries to reduce their debt by 
cutting government spending, especially social spending (since, given competitiveness or 
incentives issues, it would not be possible to raise taxes).  
Table 19. 10-year public interest rates and CDS 
June 2007 September 2010 
 
10 y rate CDS 10 y rate CDS S&P notations 
Germany 4.5 0.04 2.25 0.50 AAA/stable 
France 4.55 0.07 2.6 0.90 AAA/stable 
Italy 4.65 0.18 3.9 2.08 A+/stable 
Spain 4.55 0.07 4.2 2.37 AA/negative 
Netherlands 4.5 0.02 2.45 0.55 AAA/stable 
Belgium 4.55 0.03 3.1 1.41 AA+/stable 
Austria 4.5 0.06 2.75 0.95 AAA/stable 
Greece 4.65 0.20 10.8 7.36 BB+/negative 
Portugal 4.6 0.08 6.5 4.12 A-/negative 
Finland 4.5           n.a. 2.49 n.a. AAA/stable 
Ireland 4.45 0.13 6.75 4.54 AA/negative 
Denmark 4.45 0.13 2.35 0.45 AAA/stable 
United Kingdom 5.3  n.a. 3.05 0.74 AAA/negative 
Sweden 4.3 0.34 2.35 0.44 AAA/stable 
United States 5.0 0.13 2.7 0.60 AAA/stable 
Japan 1.85 0.23 0.95 0.97 AA/negative 
 
Governments thus face two conflicting requirements: supporting economic activity and 
ensuring their own financial situation. On the whole, capital owners want to hold substantial 
financial assets. These were obtained through a financial bubble. After the bubble burst, the 
demand deficit must be filled by public deficits and low interest rates. If financial markets do 
not accept this logic, by raising long-term interest rates, under the pretext of requesting risk 
premiums when governments support activity, if the view according to which ‘today’s deficits 
are tomorrow’s taxes; we must save more in public deficit situation’ become more and more 
common, then economic policy becomes ineffective and the world economy is out of control.  
In a world economy where financial capital stocks are huge, debts are automatically huge. 
Many private or public agents are indebted and some are more indebted than others. So there 
are always doubts about borrowers’ solvency and debt crises. Lenders want to invest large 
amounts, but then become worried that borrowers are too indebted. It is the malediction of 
lenders. Countries, companies or households receiving large external funding are vulnerable, 
as they become heavily indebted and dependent on capital markets. It is the malediction of 
borrowers. 
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Markets are herding, their expectations are self-fulfilling and markets operators are aware 
about it. They become cautious, but their vigilance increases the risk of a crisis. A slight 
doubt on the solvency of a borrower may lead to capital withdrawals and increase in interest 
rates that generate the crisis.  
The current public debts crisis does not generally come from excessive government spending 
but is the consequence of financial globalisation. CDS developments on industrial countries’ 
debt is paradoxical and dangerous. Since 1945, no industrial country has defaulted on its debt. 
Markets buy and sell insurances against a risk which has never materialised.  
In the past, the State could always use money creation, i.e. credit from the central bank. 
Markets might fear debt depreciation through inflation or currency depreciation, not State’s 
bankruptcy. However, the situation has changed since central banks’ independence (and 
especially since the creation of the ECB) which might lead to contentious situations where the 
central bank refuses to finance the State. The 2007-2009 crisis has shown central banks’ 
ability to intervene in case of danger. How to imagine that a central bank would not intervene 
to rescue his State, like it did to save banks?  
At the same time, the 2007-2009 crisis showed that unforeseeable events can occur, and 
consequently markets are more nervous, prompter to imagine extreme scenarios, which 
increases their volatility.  
Furthermore, in an extreme case where a large country (the U.S., the UK or Germany) would 
default, it is unlikely that any financial institution would be able to pay compensation 
corresponding to the CDS it sold. 
Financial institutions have found a new source of profit by creating a CDS market on 
sovereign debt, which is a speculative, parasitic and disruptive market. It boosts the 
government bonds market, which was before relatively inert. It allows markets to bet on 
States’ bankruptcy. It becomes possible for an operator to buy an insurance against a failure 
of the Greek State without even owning Greek government bonds. By raising doubts on 
countries’ ability to fulfil their commitments, some financial institutions oblige pension funds 
to buy their CDS. The losers are the Greek state, who must pay higher interest rates on its 
debt, who is obliged to undertake excessive restrictive fiscal policies and the Funds who 
already held Greek bonds, and which should now downgrade their debt, sell it at a cheaper 
price or cover it. The risk is to eliminate the market for the developed countries’ debt, like this 
was mostly the case the market for less developed countries’ debts. In the future countries will 
be reluctant to issue debt knowing that this places them under the control of markets. 
In a global financial world, economic policies must be dedicated to reassure markets, 
although markets have no relevant vision of macroeconomic developments, as evidenced by 
the large fluctuations in financial markets (stock exchange or exchange rates). It is absurd to 
claim for large public deficits cuts in a situation where global demand is low and short-term 
interest rates are close to zero. 
Countries like Spain, Ireland or even Greece have experienced strong GDP growth before the 
crisis, the crisis forces them to change their growth strategies, and markets do not help them 
by shouting there is a risk of bankruptcy. 
Against the speculation crisis, Europe could choose between two strategies:  
- Euro area members agree to help Greece by opening unlimited credit lines to 
guarantee its debt in exchange of its commitment to implement medium-term public 
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finances consolidation (but not too strong in the short term); the ECB opens unlimited 
credit lines to threatened countries; MS, the ECB and EC’s determination should be 
strong enough to discourage speculation; interest rates spreads should fell sharply. The 
issues of “moral hazard” or of the reform of the European framework should be 
forgotten for a while. 
- Euro area members give insufficient help to Greece in order to give a lesson and to 
show all MS the risk of not obeying the Stability Pact. There is a high risk that 
markets continue to speculate until Greece has no choice but default. Speculation will 
increase against the other considered as fragile countries, who will have to maintain 
high interest rates. Many financial institutions in the euro area will have to downgrade 
their Greek, Spanish and Portuguese bonds, which will deteriorate their financial 
situation. The euro area will plunge in a new financial crisis. If the crisis ends by 
Greek debt restructuring, or worse, by Greece leaving the euro area, then the area will 
be permanently fragile because speculators will have objective reasons for 
discriminating between debts in euro and for requesting significant risk premiums.  
On February 11th 2010 the European Council provided Greece a too limited support and asked 
for the Greek public deficit to be cut by 4 percent of GDP, which was already too large.  
In March, the support given by EU institutions and other MS to Greece was not sufficient. 
Aid to Greece remains conditional, subject to the unanimity rule (and so not insured) and the 
interest rate will incorporate ‘adequate pricing of risk’. But what risk? Finally, some German 
leaders did not hesitate to discuss a possible exit of Greece from the euro area, which fed 
immediately speculation.  
On May 3
rd
, the ECB finally decided to accept all Greek government bonds as collateral. 
On May 2
nd
, the MS, the EC, the ECB and the IMF agreed on a 110 billion euros rescue plan 
(over three years) for Greece. But Greece has to undertake a huge restrictive fiscal package 
(cuts in public wages, public consumption and investment, increases in VAT rates and excise 
duties, pensions system reform) to cut its government deficit from 14 percent of GDP in 2009, 
down to 8.1 percent in 2010, 7.6 in 2011, 6.5 in 2012, 4.6 in 2013, and 2.6 percent in 2014. 
The Greek government expects GDP to fall by 4 percent in 2010. A 4 percent fiscal effort, 
with a multiplier of 1, will decrease GDP by 4 percent and improve the government balance 
by 2 percent only. The debt to GDP ratio will increase by 3 percent, as GDP will fall. 
On May 10th, 2010, the EU in cooperation with the IMF created a European stabilisation fund 
of 750 billion euros. The Commission is allowed to borrow 60 billion euro, 440 billion would 
be provided by MS and 250 billion by the IMF.  The Fund would be able to buy the debt of 
countries in trouble, but this help would be given under IMF conditions, which means with 
strict conditionality. 
Ireland, Spain and Portugal also undertake huge restrictive fiscal plans. The risk is that 
financial markets are not reassured by these plans since resulting in lower GDP growth and 
several years of stagnation prospects which will make the fulfilling of public finance targets 
not credible. Financial markets’ doubts are self-fulfilling, as they induce high interest rates, 
which increase bankruptcy risks. As fiscal policy in the euro area taken as a whole is not over-
expansionary in 2010, restrictive fiscal measures required in some Southern countries should 
be accompanied by expansionary measures in most Northern countries. The EC should have 
been in a position to release economic projections showing that such measures are consistent 
with the return of balanced growth among euro area countries. On the contrary, virtuous 
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countries that undertake restrictive policies increase pressures on other countries because their 
policies affect EU activity and thus tax revenues in other countries, and because the markets 
discriminate between the debt of virtuous countries and the debt of the lax ones.  
The current situation illustrates the global economy instability driven by financial 
globalisation. Political and economic leaders should acknowledge that financial globalisation 
does not work. The global economy cannot be dominated by the games and moods of 
financial markets. The main issue for crisis exit strategies is not public debts, but speculative 
finance. The measures taken by three successive G20 Summits in 2009 did not go far enough. 
International finance should not only be regulated, but its weight should also be drastically 
reduced to prevent the global economy from being paralyzed or disrupted by financial 
markets. The weight of financial markets needs to be reduced at the benefit of a banking 
sector controlled and refocused on financing productive activities. 
One cannot let financial markets bet on the bankruptcy of sovereign states as on the 
bankruptcy of banks. Central banks must have the obligation to finance public debt, even in 
the euro area.  
If a country suffers from persistent weak private demand, the central bank should lower its 
interest rates and the government should accept a public deficit. Long-term interest rates 
should be low, which supports activity and limits the rise in public debt. Long-term interest 
rates are low if fiscal policy is credible and if monetary and fiscal policies are coordinated. In 
a flexible exchange rate regime, these policies lower the exchange rate, which is stabilising. 
Stabilising mechanisms do exist. On the contrary, economic policy is paralysed if markets 
anticipate a bankruptcy of the State and maintain high interest rates. Therefore, the risk of 
bankruptcy should be nil; the Central Bank should guarantee the public debt. In a global 
financial world, the euro area will not survive otherwise.  
Lessons of the crisis  
Greece has been particularly lax in terms of public finances, but this is not the case with other 
countries currently attacked, like Spain or Ireland. The single currency is not compatible with 
too large inflation and growth rates discrepancies among member states, as it tends to 
exacerbate them further. The SGP has allowed neither to detect imbalances, nor to solve 
them. Financial globalisation allows imbalances to rise until they burst. The euro area 
deficient framework has created the possibility of speculation as a MS is no more able to 
finance its debt by monetary creation.  
Financial markets have built a scenario where austerity measures induce weak growth and 
social unrest which may lead some countries to have to leave the euro area. If a country 
suffers from high interest rates, low growth, high unemployment and has to submit its policy 
to the EC and others MS, without recovery prospects, leaving the union may be viewed as an 
alternative. Moreover, financial markets question the credibility of rescue plans, the German 
Constitutional Court may refuse that the TFEU was violated; the Greek people can reject 
austerity measures, which may lead Germany to refuse the continuation of the plan 
Financial markets know their strength; they know that their expectations are self-fulfilling. 
They have obliged Argentina to abandon the currency board; they have obliged many 
countries the leave the EMS in 1992-93; why not the euro area, which is politically and 
institutionally fragile? 
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A new economic policy framework in the euro area?  
Several proposals were made to improve public finance and debt monitoring in Europe, even 
if public debt rises were a consequence and not a cause of the financial crisis. The debt crisis 
has strengthened the weight of the advocates of automatic fiscal rules which lack economic 
foundation. They can rely on the threat of financial markets and on the weight of Germany 
which wants to counterbalance the strengthening of European solidarity by reinforcing the 
SGP.  Focusing on the Greek crisis is a way to distract the attention from the financial crisis. 
Some economists, Jean-Claude Juncker and Yves Leterme proposed to establish a European 
Debt Agency (EDA) which would issue debt for all euro area countries. Germany is against 
this proposal, because it does not want to have to pay higher interest rates and to be obliged to 
bailout other Member States. The EDA would have to control national fiscal policies and 
would have the power too refuse to finance too lax countries. It would be a more rigid SGP, 
with the same problems. How to decide that a public deficit is too large if the Member State 
says that this deficit is needed to sustain activity (like France and Germany in 2002-05) or to 
rescue its banks?  
Gros and Mayer (2010) propose a European Monetary Fund. Each ‘sinner’ country would 
have to pay a contribution: 1% (for the part of the debt above 60% GDP)) +1% (for the part of 
the deficit higher than 3% GDP). A country in difficulty could borrow, without conditions, an 
amount corresponding to its past contributions. To obtain more, the country would have to 
accept an adjustment programme. If it did not fulfil this programme, penalties would apply 
like suppression of its structural funds, suppression of the acceptance of its debt as collateral 
by the ECB, suppression of its voting rights, and could be thrown out of the euro area. But 3% 
and 60 % remain arbitrary. It is difficult to impose fees on a State who already has financial 
difficulties. Too much conditionality, too high fees will increase market speculation, which 
may make it impossible to restore the situation. Often, the concerned State is not entirely 
responsible of these problems. The proposal does not deal with countries running too 
restrictive policies. 
Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2010) propose to introduce a blue debt, collectively issued and 
guaranteed, limited for each country at 60% of its GDP. Each year, each country’s parliament 
will have to vote to accept new debt issuance (which means that the German parliament 
would have to agree about the French deficit, for instance, and conversely). Each country 
could issue a red debt on its own responsibility. As the red debt will have a higher interest 
rate, it would discourage public debts. But 60 % remains an arbitrary level. This project will 
dramatically reduce the freedom of each country to choose its fiscal policy. Tensions will 
arise in permanence between euro area countries if national parliaments have to agree on 
partners’ budgets. The gap between the blue and the red debts will be observed, will be 
subject to permanent speculation and will influence the conduct of fiscal policies. 
The size of public debts will increase the risk of a strict monitoring of public finances by 
financial markets in the years to come. But this is not satisfying because financial markets do 
not have a macroeconomic perspective, they are pro-cyclical (they will impose efforts in bad 
times) and self-fulfilling. They have there own views on the required economic policy; is it 
necessarily the correct one? The risk is that member states make huge efforts to escape 
financial markets’ power by cutting too much public deficits, which will have long and lasting 
dampening effects on activity. Their capacity to undertake active fiscal policies will be 
reduced. What would have happened if governments had refused to help banks in order to 
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avoid them to borrow on financial markets in 2009? Can we leave the task of assessing public 
debt sustainability and of deciding on the usefulness of public deficits in the hands of 
financial markets?  
The crisis requires rethinking EU economic rules and national policy coordination. Current 
financial speculation benefits from the failures of the European economic framework. A 
single monetary policy and exchange rate are not compatible with intra-zone disparities on 
fiscal policies, wage developments and economic situations. The Greek crisis shows the 
implicit solidarity that currently unites Member States public finances in the euro area. 
However, there is a deep divergence between two views: 
- From a German view, the SGP and its ability to influence effectively fiscal policies should 
be strengthened first. Countries should be forced to bring quickly their public finances in 
balance. Countries should adopt the German fiscal brake. Countries fiscal policy should be 
controlled by the ECB or by Independent expert Committees. Countries refusing to do so and 
running too lax fiscal policies should be excluded from the euro area. “Orderly default” of a 
member state should be prepared. Countries should focus on structural reforms and 
competitiveness improvement to allow growth to recover. Since the current situation will 
oblige many countries to ask for the financial guarantee of the other member states, 
particularly of the member states best quoted by markets, these virtuous members will be able 
to impose their views. The risk is that the maintenance of the euro area will be paid by 
strengthening absurd rules, which will keep the area in recession and deprive it of fiscal 
policy.  
- From a French view, economic policies coordination must lead to a macroeconomic strategy 
designed primarily to support growth and return to full employment. Public deficits are 
necessary to support economic activity, so the rigid SGP rules should be replaced by a 
coordinating process accounting for the economic circumstances (inflation, unemployment 
and current account balances); coordination should include wage and financial policies. The 
euro area should be strengthened by removing the institutional barriers to efficient economic 
policies coordination and by developing a comprehensive and flexible strategy which will 
take national differences into account. But such a strategy will not be easy to implement: MS 
will refuse to transfer more powers to Europe, without guarantees on its policy. Managing 
diversities is very difficult: how to convince the Germans to increase their wages, the 
Spaniards and the Greeks to reduce their wages? MS, the EC and the ECB will have to 
recognise that they guarantee all MS public debts (but this is against the Treaty and how to act 
against really too lax countries?). 
On 25th March 2010, the European Council stated: “We commit to promote a strong 
coordination of economic policies in Europe. We consider that the European Council must 
improve the economic governance of the European Union and we propose to increase its role 
in economic coordination and the definition of the European Union growth strategy. The 
current situation demonstrates the need to strengthen and complement the existing framework 
to ensure fiscal sustainability in the euro zone and enhance its capacity to act in times of 
crises. For the future, surveillance of economic and budgetary risks and the instruments for 
their prevention, including the Excessive Deficit Procedure, must be strengthened. Moreover, 
we need a robust framework for crisis resolution respecting the principle of member states' 
own budgetary responsibility.” This text can be seen as a compromise between the German 
and French views. But does the EU need an ambiguous compromise?  
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On May 12th, the European Commission released a communication: ‘Reinforcing economic 
policy coordination’. It claims that ‘the rules and principles of the SGP are relevant and 
valid’. The only point is to oblige MS to respect them.  
On June 30th, the Commission proposed to introduce a ‘European semester’, the first semester 
of the year when all Member States will have to present their fiscal policies (for the short and 
the medium terms) and their structural reforms to the Commission and the European Council, 
which would give their opinion before the vote by national parliaments in the second 
semester. National parliaments will be more or less constrained by decisions taken at the EU 
level. Of course, such a dialogue would be useful if the aim was to implement a coordinated 
economic strategy, but the risk of this ‘semester’ is to increase pressure for more austerity in 
fiscal policies and more liberal reforms. We see this already: the Commission launches EDP, 
but does not ask countries that have some leeway in their fiscal policy or their wage 
developments to undertake an expansionary policy to offset the efforts of Greece, Ireland or 
Spain. This proposal was agreed by the European Council on September 7th.  
On September 29th, the Commission presented a package of proposals aiming at strengthening 
European economic governance. These proposals would reduce the autonomy of MS, would 
require strict adherence to rules without economic significance and would undermine their 
ability to stabilise their economies and to implement growth strategies. The Commission 
wants to adopt a comprehensive package of technocratic rules to increase its power:  
- MS will be sanctioned if public expenditures rise faster than the prudent medium-term 
GDP growth (unless this rise is offset by revenues increases or if the government 
balance is in surplus). This would forbid activity support through a rise in public 
spending. Who will measure the prudent growth? Will it be 1% per year as in the 
Commission’s latest estimates? Do we really need prudence now?  
- Countries with a government debt exceeding 60% of GDP may be under an EDP if the 
gap between their debt ratio and 60% has not decreased at a rate of one-twentieth by 
year on average in the last 3 years. But it is impossible to prevent this ratio from rising 
in times of economic downturn. With this rule, a country running a 90% of GDP debt 
should not have a higher than 2% of GDP deficit if GDP grows by 2%, but a 1% of 
GDP deficit if GDP grows by 1%. The decision on fines will account for cyclical 
developments and ... the reforms of pension systems introducing a funded pillar. 
- Countries with public spending rising too fast and those under an EDP will have to 
make a deposit of 0.2% of GDP, which will be converted into a fine if the required 
measures are not implemented. 
- The project keeps the 3% of GDP limit for deficits, the medium-term balance 
equilibrium target, the constraint for countries running a structural deficit to reduce 
this deficit by at least 0.5% per year, even though these constraints are economically 
unfounded and have already been the source of tensions in the area.  
- The Commission wants MS to incorporate the EU rules in their fiscal frameworks: the 
3% and 60% limits, the medium-term budgetary position in balance. The Commission 
wants to impose the fulfilment of these rules by national ‘Independent budget 
institutions’. 
- The Commission requests that a qualified majority in the European Council is needed 
to oppose the measures and sanctions recommended by the Commission.  
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- The Commission proposes to monitor excessive macroeconomic imbalances by 
following a scoreboard of a set of indicators (competitiveness, external deficit, public 
and private debts). An excessive imbalance procedure (EIP) could be launched. 
Recommendations will be sent to countries experiencing such imbalances. Fines could 
be decided. But there is no evidence that this monitoring will be symmetric, that it 
could penalise countries that affect other MS through too restrictive fiscal and wage 
policies. There is no indication that the Commission will promote a coordinated 
strategy (offsetting the restrictive policy of some countries by expansionary policies in 
others, reducing competitiveness differentials through wage increases, 
recommendation in countries where the share of wages in value added has decreased, 
launching large European loans to help Southern and Eastern MS in their convergence 
process and to finance firms adapting towards green technologies). 
The Commission's proposal requires a revision of the Lisbon Treaty; it seriously affects 
the independence of Member States and is a further step towards de-politicisation of fiscal 
policies; it will maintain permanent tensions between the Commission and Member States. 
Moreover, this project is dangerous from an economic point of view: it would oblige all 
countries to run austerity policies, which would reduce output growth, in order to reach the 
objective of public finances in balance, which may be inconsistent with the needs of 
macroeconomic balance. It requests MS to submit their fiscal policy to experts committees 
when the crisis has highlighted the need for strong and determined action. Fiscal choices will 
be more and more made by non-elected bodies. The Commission keeps a technocratic vision: 
it wants to supervise Member States deemed wasteful and unmanageable. On October 18th, 
the MS Economic and Finance Ministers endorsed this project, which still needs to receive 
the agreement of Heads of State and Government at the end of the month. The risk is high that 
this project is adopted, as even the most reluctant countries are unwilling to incur financial 
markets’ wrath. 
At the Deauville summit, 18-19 October 2010, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy agreed on 
the architecture of the Commission’s proposal, although they refused the increase in powers 
of the Commission: sanctions should be automatic, but would continue to be decided by the 
Council by qualified majority. This is an ambiguous compromise. 
The Commission’s project should open a wide debate in Europe and in every MS. It should be 
voted by each MS. The MS which are attached to active economic policies should clearly 
oppose it and propose another strategy: an open coordination of economic policies, without 
prior criteria, implementing a macroeconomic strategy targeting full employment owing to 
sustainable growth.  
 
There is no urgent need for constraining national fiscal policies in Europe, but there is an 
urgent need for undertaking reforms in three areas: 
- Financial globalisation: how to finance government and companies without allowing lenders 
to demand excessive returns? 
- Economic coordination in Europe: how to implement a common albeit allowing for 
diversified macroeconomic strategy?  
- Industrial policy:  what production in Europe in the future?  
The risk is that leading classes succeed a “shock strategy” in Europe: to use the crisis to 
impose liberal and anti-democratic reforms.  
European Debt Crisis and Fiscal Exit Strategies 
 34
References 
Becker Sebastian, Günter Deuber and Sandra Stankiewicz, 2010: ‘Public debt in 2020’, Deutsche 
Bank Research, March. 
Blanchard Olivier, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia and Paolo Mauro, 2010: ‘Rethinking 
Macroeconomic Policy’, IMF Staff Position note, February 12.  
Blanchard Olivier and Carlo Cottarelli, 2010: ‘Ten Commandments for Fiscal Adjustment in 
Advanced Economies’, IMFwebsite, June 24. 
Cecchetti Stephen, Madhusudan Mohanty and Fabrizio Zampolli, 2010: ‘The future of public 
debt, prospects and implications’, BIS Working Papers, n° 300. 
Cottarelli Carlo and José Viñals, 2009: ‘A Strategy for Renormalizing Fiscal and Monetary 
Policies in Advanced Economies’, IMF Staff Position note, September 22. 
Delpla Jacques and Jacob von Weizsäcker, 2010: ‘The blue bond proposal’, Bruegel Policy 
Brief, May. 
Deroose Servaas, Sven Langedijk and Werner Roeger, 2004: ‘Reviewing Adjustment 
Dynamics in EMU: From Overheating to Overcooling’, Economics Papers, n° 198, European 
Commission. 
ECB, 2003: Inflation Differentials in the Euro Area: Potential Causes and Policy 
implications, September. 
European Commission, DG Ecofin, 2009: Domestic Fiscal Frameworks, October. 
European Commission, 2010: Reinforcing economic policy coordination, May. 
European Commission, 2010: Economic governance package, September. 
Giavazzi Francesco, 2009: Issues in the design of a fiscal exit strategy, Paper for the Informal 
Ecofin Meeting, Götenborg. 
Gros Daniel and Thomas Mayer, 2010: Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund, CEPS Policy 
Brief n°202. 
IMF, 2010: ‘Navigating the Fiscal Challenges Ahead’, Fiscal Monitor, May. 
Le Cacheux Jacques, 2005: ‘Politiques de croissance en Europe, un problème d’action 
collective’, Revue économique, Mai. 
Mathieu Catherine and Henri Sterdyniak, 2003: ‘Réformer le Pacte de stabilité : l’état du 
débat, Revue de l’OFCE’, n° 84, January. In English : “Reforming the Stability and Growth 
Pact”, Document de travail de l’OFCE, May. 
Mathieu Catherine and Henri Sterdyniak, 2006: ‘A European Fiscal Framework designed for 
stability or growth?’, in: European Economic Policies - Alternatives to Orthodox Analysis 
and Policy Concepts, Metropolis-Verlag.  
Mathieu Catherine and Henri Sterdyniak, 2007: ‘Comment expliquer les disparités 
économiques dans l’UEM’, Revue de l’OFCE, n° 102. In English: ‘How to deal with 
economic divergences in EMU?’, Intervention Journal of Economics, Volume 4 (2007), n° 2. 
OECD, 2009: Economic Outlook, Autumn.  
OECD, 2010: Economic Outlook, Spring. 
OECD, 2010, Preparing fiscal Consolidation. 
Tilford Simon, 2006: ‘Will the Eurozone crack?’, CER, September. 
Von Hagen Jurgen., Jean Pisani-Ferry and Jacob von Weizsäcker, 2009: ‘A European exit 
strategy’, Bruegel Policy Brief, October. 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak 
35 
Wyplosz Charles, 2002: ‘Fiscal discipline in EMU: rules or institutions?’, mimeo, Meeting of 
the Group of Economic Advisers of the EC, 16 April. 
Wyplosz Charles, 2005: ‘European Monetary Union: The Dark Sides of a Major Success’, 
Economic Policy, n° 46, April. 
